

**Document 1: "Directive for Operation OLYMPIC." JCS 1331/2, 14 May 1945.** This is a report prepared by the Joint Staff and sent to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). It points to issues that still had to be settled in order for agreement to be reached on a directive for the final campaign in the Pacific. The document focuses in particular on the "who is to be in charge" question.

**Document 2: "Directive for Operation OLYMPIC." JCS 1331/3, 25 May 1945.** This is the last version of the directive for the final Pacific campaign, as dispatched to the Pacific commanders. It contains the decision on overall command of the operation. As the document indicates, a directive to prepare for the operation had already been issued to MacArthur and Nimitz on 3 April. This document is presented here, out of chronological order, because its contents are so closely related to those of document 1.

**Document 3: "Japanese Reaction to An Operation Against Southern Kyushu." JIC 191/7, 16 May 1945.** This was the eighth version of a report on anticipated Japanese reaction to an invasion of southern Kyushu. This version is included here because it was the latest iteration prepared prior to the dispatch of the directive discussed in documents 1 and 2 above.

This document demonstrates the consistency of the "six combat divisions, two depot divisions" projection for Japanese units on Kyushu Island by 1 November 1945. That estimate, first made more than a year earlier, formed the basis for the figures that would be given to President Truman on 18 June 1945. This projection remained in place right up to the eve of the Potsdam conference in July. The projected Japanese manpower figure for 1 November in this document was 390,000, rather than the 350,000 figure that was used in most of the previous versions of the report. (MacArthur's staff, for its part, estimated the number at 300,000.) The differences did not relate to combat strength but rather to numbers of support forces and naval and air-ground troops.

**Document 4: "Details of the Campaign Against Japan." JPS 697/D, 14 June 1945.** This memorandum from Admiral Leahy set up the 18 June meeting with President Truman that would review plans for bringing the war with Japan to an end. It was forwarded to the Joint Planning Staff (JPS), which directed the Joint War Plans Committee (JWPC) to draft a response. On the document's distribution list, four of the ten names are those of members of the Joint Planning Staff—two Army and two Navy officers. One of these Army representatives, Brig. Gen. Charles Cabell, was an Army Air Force (the Air Force was then part of the US Army) officer who would later go on to serve as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Two other members of the JPS—Rear Adm. B.H. Bieri and Brig. Gen. J.E. Hull, the Army's Chief of Plans—were de facto co-chairmen of the JWPC.

**Document 5: Details of the Campaign Against Japan. JWPC 369/1, 15 June 1945.** This is the JWPC's response to the JPS request for a draft reply to Admiral Leahy's memo of 14 June. Upon receiving this document, the JPS made some modifications and submitted it to the Chiefs as JCS 1388. The JPS revisions in document 5 included deletions that have BEEN marked with brackets; the most noteworthy of these are marked on pages 7 and 9. This is an especially important document because it demonstrates the military planners' sensitivity about confronting the President over casualty estimates. It does give a total estimate of roughly "a quarter of a million," which was consistent with the casualty data used by the staffs of both MacArthur and Nimitz.

**Document 6: Details of the Campaign Against Japan. JCS 1388, 16 June 1945.** This is the JPS version mentioned above. In addition to the deletions noted above, the "enclosure" attached at the end of this JCS paper is noteworthy. This enclosure, apparently prepared after the main draft was written, proposes further changes. One of these was language to replace the casualty estimate deleted from the JWPC version; this language offers the figures that General Hull had requested on 16 June for the 18 June meeting with the President. Hull's request presumably was prompted by the deletion of the JWPC figures and a belief on his part that, given the language of Admiral Leahy's memo, some figures had to be offered for the President.

**Document 7: Memorandum for the Chief of Staff: Amplifying Details on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President. Undated--presumably 17 or possibly 18 June 1945.** Prepared by General Hull after he received the response to his request for casualty figures from various Pacific operations. This is a summary of JCS 1388 (described in document 6 above), for use by General Marshall in briefing the President at the 18 June meeting.

**Document 8: Minutes of Meeting Held at the White House on Monday 18 June 1945, at 1530.**  
**Document 598 of Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS).** Diplomatic Papers: The Conference

of Berlin (Potsdam Conference), 1945. Vol. I (Washington, DC, GPO 1960, pp. 902-911). General Marshall read into the record the summary offered by General Hull (document 7 above). Tables from JCS 1388 were used at the meeting. Because some disagreement persisted over the specific language of JCS 1388, the document itself was not given to the President at that time. In fact, the agreed version was not completed until 11 July, when it was included in the background papers for the Potsdam Conference.

**Document 9: Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan. JCS 1388/1, 20 June 1945.** This document shows (a) that agreement still had not been reached on JCS 1388 by the time of the 18 June meeting with Truman (prompting Gen. Hull to prepare his summary for the President) and (b) that the casualty issue continued to be debated, with Nimitz's estimates remaining close to those offered by MacArthur's staff and by the JWPC.

**Document 10: Proposed Changes to Details of the Campaign Against Japan. Memorandum For The Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff, 25 June 1945.** This document shows that the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, apparently supported Admiral Nimitz's recommendations. It also shows, however, that the War Department did not accept these recommendations, and that the disagreement continued at least through late June.

**Document 11: Map--Estimated Japanese Dispositions on Kyushu, 21 July 1945.** From MAGIC Far East Summary of 21 July (the same day the Groves report on the successful atomic bomb test arrived in Potsdam). SRS 488.

**Document 12: Cables to Potsdam Regarding the A-Bomb Test of 16 July. *FRUS, Vol. II, Documents 1303, 1304, and 1305, pp. 1360-1369.***

**Document 13: Instruction to General Carl Spaatz on Use of the Atomic Bomb Against a Japanese Target, 25 July 1945.** This document can be found in many sources. Spaatz reportedly carried it with him when he departed for the Far East on 24 July (Far East time) to take over a newly created Air Force command role. He was under instructions to deliver the document personally to MacArthur and Nimitz.

**Document 14: Map--Estimated Distribution of Japanese Forces on Kyushu, 25 July 1945.** From MAGIC Far East Summary on that date, SRS 492.

**Document 15: Map--Estimated Disposition of Japanese Forces on Kyushu, 26 July 1945.** Also attached is a table (Document 15A) showing estimated Japanese air strength. Both items were from the MAGIC Far East Summary of 26 July, SRS 493.

**Document 16: Cable from Stimson to Truman, AGWAR Washington to Tripartite Conference, Babelsberg, Germany, 30 July 1945.** This message underscored the need for President Truman's agreement on the language of a statement that would be released as soon as the atomic bomb was used. The message alerted Truman to a text being dispatched by courier that Stimson wanted the President to approve as quickly as possible.

Truman, however, either misunderstood the request or consciously used the occasion to give his guidance on the dropping of the bomb itself. His handwritten message on the back of the cable said "no sooner than August 2" (i.e., after he had left Potsdam). This note was typed and sent to Stimson immediately, before Truman received--later that same day--the couriered text of the public statement to which Stimson had referred in his cable. The dates of these messages have generated much misinterpretation. The records are in the Truman documents collection compiled by historian Dennis Merrill.

**Document 17: Alternatives to OLYMPIC. JWPC 397, 4 August 1945.** Some interesting comments were handwritten on the document by unidentified readers. One such reader wrote, "Sec'y told we non-concur." Two other handwritten notes that appeared to accompany this document reflect concern at the senior level of the military planning groups. One of these is addressed to General Lincoln, the senior Army representative on the Joint War Plans Committee. The other refers to the views of General Cabell, the Army Air Force representative on the Joint Planning Staff.

**Documents: 18 and 18 A Through F: On the President's response to a query from Air Force Historian James Cate regarding Truman's role in the orders to use the atomic bomb. December 1952-January 1953.** These documents are from the Truman records compiled by Dennis Merrill. They include Cate's letter of request and Truman's handwritten draft response--a personal note in which he said General Marshall had told him that the invasion would have cost "at a minimum a quarter of a million

casualties."